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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
KENDALL INSURANCE, INC., and
SHIRLEY ANN MORGAN, and
CHARLES MORGAN

APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF

Plaintiffs and Appellees,

Case#: 20060570

v.
R&RGROUP,INC.,and
RICK B. STANZIONE,
Defendants and Appellants

JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a civil judgment in the Second District Court, Weber County.
Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(j) and later §78-2a-3(j) conferred jurisdiction upon this court.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Did the lower court err as a matter of law by finding that there was a mutual mistake of
fact as to the value of the business when the Morgans signed an integrated contract
containing a clause stating that they had made an accounting of the business previous to
the sale and that they were satisfied with that accounting?
2. Did the lower court abuse its discretion in making a finding that there was a "mutual
mistake of fact" when that finding is contrary to the evidence offered at trial?

3. Did the lower court commit prejudicial error by failing to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law to dispose of issues addressed in the order to show cause?
4. Did the lower court err as a matter of law by failing to award Stanzione his attorney's fees
where the promissory note calls for "all" fees to be reimbursed and where Stanzione
prevailed on all contractual claims?
5. Did the lower court improperly deny Appellants' Rule 60(b) motion for relief from
judgment?

STATUTORY PROVISION WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 60(B) (complete text in addendum)

RELATED APPEALS
Appellants are not aware of any related appeals.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This appeal is from a final civil judgment entered on February 27, 2006; findings of fact and
conclusions of law were entered concurrently. This appeal is also from a memorandum decision
filed by the lower court on August 2, 2006 denying a timely filed Rule 60(b) motion.
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Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
On October 31 and November 1, 2005, the lower court held a bench trial on the instant
dispute. Trial proceedings were merged with order to show cause issues that were previously heard
by the lower court (in part) but were not decided previous to trial because many issues that
remained to be heard overlapped with trial issues. See Trial Transcript, 1. Issues from the Order
to Show Cause included whether or not the Appellees ("Morgans") should be held in contempt of
court for failure to comply with the August 9, 2004 order directing them to forward the entire book
of business to the Appellants ("Stanzione") and whether or not the Morgans should be held in
contempt of court for attempting to circumvent the intent of the lower court's order by deceptively
encouraging clients of Kendell Insurance Agency, Inc. or Kendell Insurance LLC ("Kendall
Insurance") to transfer their insurance policies to a new entity operated, owned, and controlled by
the Plaintiffs instead of remaining under the control of the Defendants when said client accounts
were to be forwarded as an asset to the Defendants. Attorney's fees were also requested as a part
of said order to show cause. See Record Index^ 111-13; 118-23, 133-38. These order to show cause
issues were repeatedly referred to and addressed during trial (e.g., See Trial Transcript, 16:11-25 18:1-11; 19:20-25 - 21:1-20; 22:5-19; 124:17-25).
At trial, Morgans claimed that Stanzione represented the value of the sale of the book of
business at issue to be between $850,000 and $1,000,000 while it was in fact worth approximately
50% of those representations. See Trial Transcript, 7:20-23; 4:40; 7:2. Stanzione responded that
an accounting of the income from the book of business would show that the business was not only
represented accurately but that the Morgans had three to four weeks to audit the records and that
the contract they signed represented that they had an opportunity to audit the records and were
satisfied with the results and that the sale was "as is". See Trial Transcript, 16:11-18; 15:14-19.
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Stanzione further claimed that the Morgans failed to abide by a previous order to turn the business
over to Stanzione by cannibalizing the business by diverting clientele into a newly created entity
owned by the Morgans and that he suffered damages as a result of these actions. See Trial
Transcript, 16:19-25.
In its final order, the lower court declared that Stanzione was the prevailing party, that he
had control of all of the stocks and assets of Kendall Insurance, that he was entitled to attorneys
fees in an amount not to exceed $17,500.00, and that he had to return $75,000.00 in payments
made by the Morgans as a result of a "mutual mistake" made at the time of negotiating said
contract. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, findings paragraphs 28, 30; conclusions
paragraphs 2, 4 (included in Addendum, 1-10).
Stanzione thereafter filed a Rule 60(b) motion requesting relief from the judgment.
The lower court declined to make any findings regarding the Rule 60(b) motion apart from finding
that "theie is no reason justifying the relief sought" and if any findings of fact and conclusions of
law were in erroi "that determination will be made by the higher court." See Memorandum
Decision dated August 2, 2006 (included in Addendum, 35),
While Stanzione was not requesting the lower court to correct its findings of fact and
conclusions of law in the rule 60(b) motion, the findings were at issue because they required the
"prevailing party" to pay the non-prevailing party substantial sums of money because there were
no findings of fact and conclusions of law made concerning the order to show cause that should
have offset any potential liability of the "prevailing party" to pay the non-prevailing part many
thousands of dollars while at the same time being awarded a then cannibalized business that was
healthy and viable before the litigation began. The rule 60(b) motion merely requested relief from
having to pay monies on a judgment because the lower court made an error in not making findings

4

of fact and conclusions of law surrounding the order to show cause issues that demonstrated
substantial monies lost by the "prevailing party" far exceeded monies that the "prevailing party"
was ordered to pay to the non-prevailing parties - it did not request any relief in the form of any
new findings of fact or conclusions of law or by requesting any modification of the judgment. See
Motion and Memorandum for Relief from Judgment or Order (Record Index, 280-83).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The instant dispute is over a contract for the sale of a business - Kendall Insurance.
Stanzione sold all of the stock and related assets of Kendall Insurance to the Morgans. Paul
Nelson, an insurance agent, assisted the Morgans in the negotiation of said contract and said
contract was signed and entered into on September 1, 2003. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, paragraph 1, 7, 10 (Record Index, 240 et seq.) and Addendum, 18-25. The primary cause
of action brought by the Morgans at trial was whether or not Stanzione misrepresented the value
of the business. See Trial Transcript. 7:20-23: 4:40; 7:2.
In addition to an integration clause/ the contract specifically stated that "Copies of the
latest information concerning the business activities and financial affairs of Kendell Insurance Inc.
have been made available to and have been inspected by buyer [Morgans] to its complete and total
satisfaction incident to which buyer has received the professional advice and expertise of a certified
public accountant retained by buyer". See Trial Transcript, 135:14-25 - 136:1-8 and

Addendum,

23. Shirley Morgan testified that she agreed to this statement when she signed it. See Trial

The clause reads "This purchase agreement embodies the entire agreement between seller and buyer and
will not be modified or terminated except by an agreement in writing." Nevertheless, despite this clause and
the acknowledgement of an accounting being made to the Morgans' satisfaction in the same contract, the
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Transcript, 137:6-10.2 She further testified that the Morgans not only had the opportunity to
modify the contract but that they took advantage of that opportunity and made some changes to
another portion of the contract. See Trial Transcript 137:21-25 - 138:1-18. Lastly, she testified
that she was "pretty sure" that her legal counsel looked over the contract on the Morgans' behalf.
See Trial Transcript 147:16-24.
At trial, Paul Nelson (witness for the Morgans) testified that Stanzione represented that
the book of business was worth one million dollars. He further stated that if this value was correct,
the Morgans would expect to see a monthly income equal to one twelfth often percent of that
figure. In other words, the Morgans should have expected to see a monthly income equal to ten
percent of $1,000,000 divided by 12. Simple math shows that this would be a monthly income of
$8,333.33. See Trial Transcript, 50:13-25 - 51:1-4; 69:8-11. No other witness for the Morgans gave
any contradicting methodology as to how to compute the value of a book of business or gave any
information as to any expectations that may have been contrary to this calculation.
At trial, Stanzione's accountant testified that a review of the Kendall Insurance general
account showed that Stanzione averaged a gross pre-sale monthly income of $9,761.003 while
operating Kendall Insurance from approximately March 2002 until August 31, 2003 - a figure
higher than that expected by Paul Nelson. See Trial Transcript, 274:4 and Addendum, 26. He
further testified that based upon his review of the same general account, the Morgans averaged a
gross income of $11,805.00 from September I, 2003 to August 31, 2004 and that there was no

Morgans' entire case revolved around claims that the value of the business was misrepresented. See Trial
Transcript440:8-16 and Addendum, 24.
2
Ms. Morgan subsequently stated that this information in the contract was inaccurate. See the following
lines of the transcript.
3
Stanzione testified that the net commission income was approximately $7,200.00. See Trial Transcript
322:5-7.

6

indication of any significant deposits from non-commission sources that would substantially
change this conclusion - this monthly income is nearly $3,500.00 higher than that expected by
Paul Nelson.4 See Trial Transcript, 274:15-17 and Addendum, 26. Contrary to the accountant's
summary of commission income received during the Morgans' control of Kendall Insurance
{Addendum, 26-27), Ms. Morgan testified that there was "no commissions coming in for a couple of
months." See Trial Transcript, 16:20.
After the business was returned to Stanzione, the monthly commission income was reduced
by approximately 75%. His accountant further testified that Stanzione averaged a gross income of
$2,358.00 monthly from September 2004 until July of the following year (Stanzione gained partial
control of Kendall Insurance on or about September 2004). See Trial Transcript, 275:22-24 and
Addendum, 27.
Nevertheless, the lower court concluded that a "mutual mistake of fact relating to the value
and composition of the Kendall Insurance Agency and its book of business existed at the time that
the sale of the agency was negotiated between Defendants and the Morgans." See Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 28. The lower court further found that "commission income []
was significantly less than the representations which [Morgans] had received [from Stanzione]." See
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 14; Trial Transcript, 113:16-23.

The lower court found that the Morgans paid to Stanzione and/or the Kendall Insurance an amount
exceeding $10,300.00 and while this fact was not specifically connected to the value of the business, it seems
reasonable to infer that the lower court was finding that the $11,805.00 monthly commission income figure
should have been reduced by approximately $10,300.00 a year or $858.33 a month - this suggests that the
lower judge was accepting additional testimony of Stanzione's accountant in regards to this issue {Trial
Transcript, 276:19-25 - 277:1 and Findings of Fact and Conclusions ofLaw, paragraph 29) and/or the court
could have been relying on Ms. Morgan's testimony {Trial Transcript, 113:16-23 and/or Plaintiffs7Exhibit
100, Tabs 14-15.
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The Morgans operated the Kendall Insurance for several months. During that time,
Shirley Ann Morgan was to operate the business but she was not competent to manage or
supervise the business activities. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraphs 8-9.
However, it was only three months following the sale when the Morgans and Paul Nelson began
alleging that the commission income (represented by monies received into the general account) was
significantly less than the representations they had been given by Stanzione. See Trial Transcript,
51:5-11; 128:19-25 -129:1-20; but see 161:24-25 - 162:1-3. Other allegations were made about the
representations of the number of active clients identified as part of the book of business of Kendall
Insurance. See Trial Transcript, 48:11-25 - 49:1-10. Consequently, the Morgans requested a
reformation of said contract. See Trial Transcript, 128:20-25 - 129:1-2; 130:14-18. Stanzione
refused to reform the contract and in December 2003, he demanded full performance under said
contract and payment in full. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 16. The
Morgans did not make any further payments under the contract. See Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, paragraph 15. Subsequently, the Morgans filed the instant action.
After various disputes over the ownership of Kendall Insurance, Stanzione motioned the
lower court to order the Morgans to return control of the Kendall Insurance book of business to
Stanzione. An order directing the return of Kendal Insurance to Stanzione was entered on August
9, 2004. See Addendum, 35. Subsequently, Stanzione filed an order to show cause alleging that
the Morgans did not return the entire book of business and that the Morgans had engaged in
fraudulent and illicit business practice to disassociate a substantial majority of profitable clients
from Kendall Insurance before returning the book of business to Stanzione. The order to show
cause requested a finding of contempt and reimbursement for various damages incurred as a result
of the Morgans' actions. See Record Index, 111-13; 118-23; 133-38. The lower court merged the
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order t o show issues with the trial issues and all issues were presented, defended, and pursued at
trial. See Trial Transcript,

1. However, t h e lower court made no findings concerning whether or

not the Morgans failed to timely or substantially abide by t h e August 9, 2004 order or whether or
not they engaged in illicit business practices (and thereby circumvented the purposes of said order)
by diverting Kendall Insurance policies into another entity owned by the Morgans before t u r n i n g
t h e business over t o Stanzione. F u r t h e r , the lower court did not make any findings addressing t h e
damage issues raised by Stanzione in the order to show cause.
Lastly, t h e lower court awarded attorney's fees to the "prevailing party" b u t capped those
fees at $17,500.00 without offering any rationale or justification when t h e promissory note itself
allows for "all" fees to be rewarded to the prevailing party. See Findings of Fact and
of Law, 30; Addendum,

Conclusions

25. 5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
T h e lower court improperly found t h a t there was a " m u t u a l mistake" as to the value of the
business because the apparent findings of the lower court were t h a t the monthly commission of t h e
Morgans was approximately $11,000.00 (as explained in footnote 4 above) and, when considered in
conjunction with all other evidence introduced at trial, these findings can only be read to
demonstrate t h a t the Morgans were making monthly commission income in excess of what they
should have expected to receive were t h e business to be valued in accordance with their own
testimony and t h e testimony of their own witness - if all of t h e evidence delineated in the findings

5

Although no exact figure was offered to the court, Stanzione's current counsel's fees were approximately
$17,500.00 immediately after the trial but Stanzione had incurred many thousands of dollars in attorney's
fees previous to that time and no explanation was given as to why those fees would be considered
"unreasonable" (See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 30).
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of fact were construed in favor of the Morgans and if the remaining evidence is considered, this
figure would be about $3,000.00 a month more than the Morgans claimed that they would have
expected to receive.
Even if there was a "mutual mistake" as to the value of the business in question, the lower
court improperly rescinded the contract in dispute based upon a "mutual mistake" because the
contract in question contained both an integration clause and an "as is" clause and because there
was no finding of affirmative or positive fraud justifying a rescission of the contract.
The lower court improperly failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law
concerning the order to show cause that was merged with the trial proceedings and the lower court
improperly failed to make any findings of fact justifying a cap on the prevailing parties' attorney's
fees because the contract calls for "all" fees to be reimbursed.
Lastly, the lower court improperly denied Stanzione's Rule 60(b) motion because it failed
to understand that Stanzione was not requesting an amended judgment or amended findings of
fact and conclusions of law - Stanzione was merely requesting a relief from the judgment as
allowed by the rule and his motion should have been considered on its merits.

ARGUMENT
Did the lower court err as a matter of law by finding that there was a mutual mistake of
fact as to the value of the business when the Morgans signed an integrated contract
containing a clause stating that they had made an accounting of the business previous to
the sale and that they were satisfied with that accounting?
Appellate courts in Utah should grant no deference to questions of law reached by lower
courts. Scharfv. BMG Corp. 700, P. 2d 1068 (Utah, 1985); Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P. 2d
1127 (Utah 1990^; The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that matters of law are
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specifically applied to the interpretation and review of contracts. Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Const.,
Inc., 983P.2d 575 (Utah 1999/
In the instant case, the contract in question has an integration clause and states in plain
language that the Morgans had "[cjopies of the latest information concerning the business
activities and financial affairs of Kendell Insurance Agency, Inc." and that these records were
"made available to and [were] inspected by [the Morgans] to [theii] complete and total satisfaction
incident to which [the Morgans] received the professional advise and expertise of a certified public
accountant retained by [the Morgans]." Emphasis added. See Addendum, 23. Accordingly, the
question as to whether or not the business was inaccurately represented to the Morgans by
Stanzione should not have been entertained by the court unless there was an accusation of
affirmative and positive fraud. Maack v. Resource Design & Const., Inc., 875 P.2d 570, Utah App.,
1994 citing Kaye v. Buehrle, 8 Ohio App. 3d 381, 457 N.E.2d 373, 376 (1983) (holding that "as is"
clause bars claim for fraudulent nondisclosure but permits claim for "positive" fraud).
As a matter of public policy, the Maack rule is a good one because parties should retain
control of their contractual bargains; when a party signs their name to an agreement containing an
"as is" clause designed to prevent future litigation over the value of a business (and the clause in
the instant contract appears to be designed for that exact purpose), courts should not entertain
subsequent complaints claiming that the statements in the contract are untrue (that their C.P.A.
inspected copies of all of the latest business records to their complete and total satisfaction) unless
a party is accused of affirmative or positive fraud that would justify relieving a party from being
bound to an inequitable contract.
In the instant case, the Morgans did claim reckless or intentional misrepresentation of the
contract under their initial complaint - however, the lower court made a finding that directly
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precluded any reckless or intentional misrepresentation when it determined that there was a
mutual mistake. Accordingly, since a "mutual mistake" does not satisfy the standard of an
affirmative and/or positive fraud as articulated under Maack, this Court should reverse the lower
court's order rescinding the contract based upon a finding of a "mutual mistake". See Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Conclusion paragraph 1. Further^ this Court should grant
Stanzione's request for relief below by enforcing the contractual terms requiring the Morgans to
finish making payments for Kendall Insurance and by requiring Stanzione to return Kendall
Insurance to the Morgans.

Did the lower court abuse its discretion in making a finding that there was a "mutual
mistake of fact" when that finding is contrary to the evidence offered at trial?
Appellate courts have long held that challenges to factual findings made by lower courts
are reviewed at the very high bar of an abuse of discretion standard. State v. All Real Property, 37
P.2d 276 (2001)(discretion of adopting findings is within the discretion of the court as long as the
findings are not clearly contrary to the evidence).
As outlined in the statement of facts above, the only evidence before the lower court
concerning the valuation of the business came from Paul Nelson's testimony and he testified that a
million dollar book of business should genemte about $8,000.00 in monthly commissions. In the
instant case, the general account statements were all entered into evidence and were summarized
by Stanzione's accountant (Addendum, 26-27). This accounting demonstrated that the business
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was actually generating $9,761.00 previous t o t h e sale t o the Morgans and demonstrated t h a t t h e
business generated $11,805.00 under t h e Morgans control of the business. Again, even if the lower
court was intending to find t h a t t h e monthly commission figure under t h e Morgans control should
have been reduced by t h e $10,300.00 figure ($858.33 monthly) cited in its findings of fact and
conclusions of law, t h e monthly income was still well over the figure predicted by the Morgans'
witness - t h e same witness t h a t was advising t h e m as t o whether or not they should purchase t h e
business under t h e contract in dispute. While Ms. Morgan did testify t h a t there were a couple of
m o n t h s where no commission was received at all, t h e general bank account records and the
s u m m a r y of those records by t h e accountant demonstrate t h a t this statement was simply not true
and not justifiable. 7 Further, even if this statement were true, the average monthly income
remained higher t h a n t h e income predicted by P a u l Nelson. 8 Therefore, there is simply nothing
substantial in t h e record t h a t would justify a finding t h a t there was a "mutual mistake" as to t h e

b

Counsel for Morgans noted that some of the monies in the pre-sale transfer would have included broker fees
that the Morgans did not feel comfortable charging their clients (their was a dispute below that is not before
this Court as to whether or not these fees are legal and/or ethical). See Trial Transcript, 416:18-25 - 417:1-2.
However, these broker fees were not included in the Morgans' monthly income. Id. Counsel further argued
that these numbers could have significantly reduced the monthly income potential of the business. See Trial
Transcript, 417:3-25-418:1-5. The fact that Stanzione's accountant and three other witnesses testified that
broker fees were a minimal portion of the commissions (less than 1%; See Trial Transcript, 436:5-25 - 437:13) is almost irrelevant because, as noted above, the Morgans were making over $3,000 a month more than
their witness expected that they should make if the business was really worth what Stanzione said it was the fact that Stanzione's lesser monthly income may have included other fees is entirely irrelevant.
The accountant testified that some deposits may have been transfers from personal funds but determined
that those transfers would have been limited to about $10,000.00 and that the largest monthly series of
deposits of this nature was around $3,000.00 - a figure that would prohibit the possibility that there was ever
more than one month of income that fit the description of Ms. Morgan's testimony. Trial Transcript^ 276:1925-277:1
8
If Paul Nelson's method of valuing the business (monthly income X 12 X 10) is correct, the business under
the Morgans' tenure [adjusting for the lower court's apparent finding] is $1,313,600.40) - and it is worth
noting that this was under the supervision of Ms. Morgan whom the lower court found was incompetent to
run the business.
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value of the business at the time the parties signed the contract and this Court should reverse the
lower court's finding of fact on this issue.

Did the lower court commit prejudicial error by failing to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law to dispose of issues addressed in the order to show cause?
Appellate courts in Utah have found that the failure of lower courts to make findings of fact
and conclusions of law on all issues raised in the proceedings below is prejudicial error subject to
remand. Huber v. Newman, 1944, 145P.2d 780. (Trial court must make findings on all issues
raised by the pleadings and evidence.)] Baird v. Upper CanalIrr. Co., 1927, 257P. 1060. (In
contested cases, court must find on all material issues submitted'unless

findings are waived.);

Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 1977, 567P.2d 1112. (It is the duty of the trial judge in contested cases to find
facts upon all material issues submitted for decision unless findings are waived. See also State v.
All Real Property 2001, 37 P.3d 276); Silliman v. Powell 1982, 642 P2d 388 /As the determiner
of fact, trial court is required to make findings on all material issues. See also Quagliana v.
Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 1975, 538 P.2d 301; Sorenson v. Beers, 1980, 614 P.2d 159. (Trial
court must make findings on all material factual issues raised by evidence. cfRule 15b. See also
Thomas v. Clayton Piano Co., 1915.); Parish v. Parish, 1934, 35 P.2d 999. (Trial court need not
follow language of pleadings in fact findings, but findings should be made on every material issue
presented)',

OfGorman v. Utah Realty & Construction Co., 1942, 102 Utah 523, 129 P.2d 981,

modified 102 Utah 534, 133 P.2d 318. (A direct issue of a specific material fact requires a finding on
that issue and there must be a finding on all material issues.)\_Duncan v. Hemmelwright, 1947, 112
Utah 262, 186 P.2d 965. ^Failure to make findings a fact on material issues is error, and ordinarily
prejudicial.). See also General Ins. Co. of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 506
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(Utah 1976) (trial of an issue by implicit consent allows an issue to be t r e a t e d as if it was raised in
t h e pleadings).
None of t h e issues raised by t h e order to show cause were addressed by t h e lower court in
its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Specifically, there is no finding as to whether or not t h e
Morgans failed t o comply with t h e lower court's order to forward the entire book of business t o
Stanzione or whether or not the Morgans attempted to circumvent t h e intent of the lower court's
order by deceptively encouraging clients of the business to transfer their policies t o an entity
owned and controlled by the Morgans. While Morgans are likely to argue t h a t the lower court did
make some findings suggestingthat

there was a mutual fault of the parties t h a t prevented the

Morgans from forwarding the entire book of business to Stanzione, there is nothing clear in the
findings of fact and conclusions of law t h a t states that this was t h e lower court's finding and
further, there is absolutely nothing in the lower court's findings t h a t remotely hints at whether or
not the Morgans were attempting to deceive Kendall Insurance clients to transfer their policies to
an entity owned and controlled by the Morgans - a primary issue of the order to show cause. 9
F u r t h e r , there is nothing in the lower court's findings t h a t addresses whether or not the Morgans
are liable for any of the damages Stanzione claimed to suffer as a result of these alleged actions by
t h e Morgans.

9

That this issue was a primary issue at trial is evidenced by the fact that counsel for Stanzione summarized
the evidence and testimony given on this issue on pages 449-456 of the Trial Transcript - approximately half
of his closing argument. See Trial Transcript, 432-456. Apart from dozens of places on the record where this
issue is addressed by both parties, this issue was also the primary thrust behind Ben Opheikens {Trial
Transcript, 176-198) and Darlene Stain [Trial Transcript, 199-216) being called to testify before the lower
court. These witnesses were policy holders who were confused by the Morgans' efforts to transfer their
policies away from Kendall Insurance (and into the Morgans' other business) and who alleged deceptive
practices by the Morgans as part of the Morgans' effort to move business away from Kendall Insurance
before returning the book of business to Stanzione as per the lower court's order.
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The important factor to this question before this Court is whether or not the lower court's
failure to address these issues in the findings of fact and conclusions of law resulted in any
prejudice to Stanzione. The answer to that is evident from the harsh effects of the final judgment
and is succinctly summarized in two lines of the trial transcript: Stanzione requested a minimum of
$111,000.00 in damages for lost revenue 10 as a result of the Morgan's failure to abide by the order
to show cause. See Trial Transcript 455:18-19.

Did the lower court err as a matter of law by failing to award Stanzione his attorney's fees
where the promissory note calls for "all" fees to be reimbursed and where Stanzione
prevailed on all contractual claims?
The Utah Supreme Court has held that lower courts have the discretion to limit a
contractual award of attorneys fees when the prevailing party did not prevail on all major causes of
action. Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606, (Utah 1976); see also Jenkins v. Bailey, 676 P.2d 391
(Utah 1984); but see Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah App. 1989)("Couits have, in
extraordinary situations, declined to award attorney fees to a prevailing party in spite of an
enforceable contractual provision" - fn 3 [citing cases where forfeituie was invoked, where the
prevailing party refused two generous offers of settlement, and where both parties acted
improperly]). Accordingly, the question before this Court is whether or not the lower court abused
its discretion in not awarding Stanzione his attorney's fees when the lower court found that he was
the prevailing party as to all contractual causes of action and when there is nothing in the lower
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law that suggests that there was any extraordinary
situation justifying a refusal to grant Stanzione his full attorney's fees under the contract. Cobabe

10

This figure only represented lost revenue up until the date of trial and was a request additional to his
prayer for relief to enforce the contract.
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suggests that the lower court did not abuse its discretion if it found there was an "extraordinary
situation" that would justify it in declining to award Stanzione his full attorneys fees. However,
such a finding does not exist in the instant case. Although this Court could find that the lower
court determined that both parties "acted improperly" after reviewing its findings of fact and
conclusions of law, this Court should note that all of these actions were in reference to the issues
raised in the order to show cause and had nothing to do with the causes of action raised in the
complaint, which is the determining document as to the award of attorney's fees. Further, there is
nothing in the lower court's findings of fact and conclusions of law stating that the award was
reduced because of the order to show cause issues. In fact, the award seems to be limited to
Stanzione's current counsel's fees at the time of trial (see footnote 5 above) and those fees included
the order to show cause issues - the fees that the lower court failed to award were incurred under
previous counsel and none of those fees were related to the order to show cause (which was filed by
current counsel). It appears therefore that the lower court's award of attorney's fees was either
capped without justification or the lower court intended to make a full award of attorney's fees but
made a simple administrative error by not noticing that Stanzione had incurred attorney's fees
that were not entirely a part of his current counsel's fees.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the lower court's award of attorney's fees and grant
Stanzione his entire attorney's fees as established by affidavit and under the relevant rules of civil
procedure.
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Did the lower court improperly deny Appellants' Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment?
If this Court grants Stanzione's requests to reverse the lower court's order for either of the
issues dealing with the "mutual mistake" above, this portion of the appeal will most likely be
rendered moot. Therefore, this issue is presented in the alternative and as follows:
Appellate courts in Utah should grant no deference to questions of law reached by lower
courts. Scharfv. BMG Corp. 700, P.2d 1068 fUtah, 1985^; Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d
1127 (Utah 1990/ Interpretation of rules is clearly a matter of law. Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure provides that:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect ... or (6) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
In the instant case, Stanzione filed a Rule 60(b) motion requesting relief from the judgment
because the lower court's failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law surrounding the
order to show cause issues resulted in Stanzione being inequitably burdened by an order to repay
the Morgans their initial deposit of $75,000.00 under the contract while losing at least $110,000.00
of commission income and being awarded only a portion of his attorney's fees and a cannibalized
business worth only about 25% of what it was worth previous to the sale to the Morgans.
Had the lower court declared Stanzione the non-prevailing party, a Rule 60(b) motion
probably would not have had any merit worth the lower court's consideration.

However,

Stanzione was declared the "prevailing party" under the contractual causes of action but was dealt
a very inequitable result by the lower court under its "equitable" rescission of contract theory.
Stanzione's Rule 60(b) motion simply claimed that since the lower court failed to make findings of
fact and conclusions of law surrounding the order to show cause issues (and thereby ignored his
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request for $110,000.00 in lost revenue), and since the lower court failed to award Stanzione all of
his attorney's fees, and since the lower court awarded him a gutted business worth only a fraction
of its value before the contract was entered into, and since Stanzione was also required to pay the
Morgans $75,000.00, the judgment was unjust in such a way as to satisfy subsection 6 of Rule 60(b)
and that this inequitable result was the result of the lower court's mistake under subsection 1 of
Rule 60(b). His request for relief was not to remedy or reverse all of the other inequitable results
he suffered below. The only relief he requested under the Rule 60(b) motion was to be relieved
from paying the judgment Stanzione now has against him - the prevailing party.
Unfortunately for Stanzione, the lower court apparently understood this motion to be a
request for new or additional findings of fact and conclusions of law because it responded by stating
that "[i]f those findings and conclusions are in error, that determination will be made by the higher
court." See Addendum, 35. The lower court's confusion is somewhat understandable in light of
the fact that the Rule 60(b) motion necessarily addressed case law identifying the lower court's
failure to make any findings of fact and conclusions of law as prejudicial error (hence the mistake
under subsection 1 of Rule 60(b)) and claimed that this mistake justified relief from the judgment.
However, as argued above, Stanzione's request for relief was meritorious and ought to have been
granted. As it stands, the "prevailing party" lost his bargain (approximately $220,000.00 plus
interest remains unpaid under the contract), he lost 75% of the value of his business under an
"equitable" rescission of contract order, he lost approximately $10,000.00 in attorney's fees that
were not awarded to him as per contractual terms, he lost $110,000 in revenue, and he was ordered
to pay $75,000.00 back to the losing party who agreed that they were completely and totally
satisfied with their accounting of the business records before they signed the contract in the first
place.
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Stanzione's Rule 60(b) motion was meritorious and should have been considered by the
lower court.

The lower court was apparently confused by the issues presented in Stanzione's

motion and thereby failed to consider it on its merits. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the
lower court's Memorandum Decision and should remand the case for further decision.

CONCLUSION

For all of the above and foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse and remand the lower court's
final order, grant Stanzione his prayer for relief by enforcing the contractual terms as they stood
previous to the filing of the complaint, and remand the case for further proceedings so that the
lower court can determine whether or not Stanzione is entitled to further relief under his order to
show cause issues presented and to determine the amount of Stanzione's attorney's fees. In
addition or in the alternative, this Court should reverse the lower court's Memorandum Decision
and remand this case for the lower court's consideration of Stanzione's Rule 60(b) motion.

vJDrea-Brin^y^J2o«iisel for Appellants
DATE: November 23, 2006

/
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